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Abstract
We introduce a formal model for membership and order queries on privacy-preserving au-
thenticated lists. In this model, the queries are performed on the list stored in the cloud where
data integrity and privacy have to be maintained. We then present an efficient construction of
privacy-preserving authenticated lists based on bilinear accumulators and bilinear maps, analyze
the performance, and prove the integrity and privacy of this construction under widely accepted
assumptions.
1 Introduction
An authenticated data structure [Tam03] is a structured collection of data (e.g., a list, tree, graph,
or map) along with a set of query operations defined on it. Three parties are involved in an
authenticated data structure (ADS) scheme, namely, the data owner, the server and the client/user.
ADS framework allows the data owner to outsource data processing tasks to an untrusted server
without loss of data integrity for clients. This is achieved as follows. The data owner is a trusted
source of a dataset who produces authentication information about the dataset (ordered list in our
case) and a short digest signature and sends it to the client. The server maintains a copy of the
dataset along with the authentication information produced by the owner. He responds to client
queries about the dataset by returning the query result and a compact proof (also called answer
authentication information). The client can then use the digest signature, query result and the
proof obtained from the server to verify the integrity of the answer.
However, classic hash-based authenticated data structures were designed without taking into
account privacy goals and provide proofs that leak information about the dataset beyond the query
answer. For example, in a hash tree [Mer80, Mer89] for a set of n elements, the proof of the
membership of an element in the set has size log n, thus leaking information about the size of
the set. Also, if the elements are stored at the leaves in sorted order, the proof of membership
of an element reveals its rank. Similar information leaks occur in other hash-based authenticated
data structures for dictionaries and maps, such as authenticated skips lists [MTGS01]. As another
example consider an approach for supporting non-membership proofs using an authenticated data
structure that supports membership proofs. This method involves storing intervals of consecutive
elements (xi, xi+1) and returning as a proof of non-membership of a query element x the interval
(xi, xi+1) such that xi < x < xi+1. Hence, the proof trivially reveals two elements of the set.
We denote as a privacy-preserving authenticated data structure an ADS that has an additional
privacy property. This property ensures that the proof returned by the server to the client does
not reveal any information about the dataset beyond what can be learned from the current and
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previous answers to queries to the dataset. In this paper we study one such data structure, a
privacy-preserving authenticated list (PPAL), for which we consider membership and order queries.
A privacy-preserving authenticated list allows an owner to outsource to the server data with
different access control policies imposed on it. Hence, when the owner outsources it to the server,
clients can access only parts of it from the server and verify that it is indeed owner’s authentic data
but should not be allowed to learn about the data they do not have permission to access. Hence,
privacy policy should be also imposed on the proofs of authenticity of the data that the clients
learn (the property not supported by many classical ADS). A concrete example is an SQL query
containing an “order by” clause on the data that is sensitive and the client is allowed to learn only
a partial result of such query and not how her data is positioned w.r.t. the rest of the data. Privacy
preserving release and comparison of verifiable medical records [BB12] and best seller lists that do
not reveal relative ranking for items in different lists are some other important applications of the
PPAL framework. Moreover, a privacy-preserving authenticated list is an important building block
for designing efficient hierarchical privacy-preserving data structures, e.g., ordered trees that store
XML data.
In this paper, we present a framework and an efficient construction for privacy-preserving au-
thenticated lists that supports membership queries and queries on the relative order of two (or more)
elements of the list. This framework guarantees integrity for both types of the queries through a
compact proof returned to the client. The proof does not reveal the actual ranks of the elements
nor any order information between elements other that what can be inferred from the current and
previous answers by the rule of transitivity.
1.1 Problem Statement
In this section we define the query structure and the adversarial model and discuss about the
efficiency goals.
1.1.1 Query operations
Let L be a linearly ordered list of elements. We consider a data structure that supports the following
operations on L:
• Membership query : Given a query element x, the server checks whether x is in L. If so, then
the server returns a proof of the membership of x in list L, called member proof. Else, the
server returns null.
• Order query : Given a pair of query elements (x, y) of L, the server returns the pair with its
elements rearranged according to their order in L together with a proof of this ordering, called
order proof. For example, if y precedes x in L, then the pair (y, x) is returned as an answer.
For generality, the data structure also supports queries for multiple elements. Namely, the above
queries can take as argument a list δ of query elements. For a membership query, the server returns
proofs for the elements of δ in L. For an order query, the server returns a permutation of list δ
according to the ordering of the elements in L together with a proof of the ordering. Finally, we
also consider a hybrid list-map data structure where the list stores identifier-value items and a
membership query returns the value associated with a given identifier together with a proof that
the pair is in the list. Note that we do not address nonmembership proofs (e.g., [DT08]).
1.1.2 Adversarial model and security properties
Following the authenticated data structure model, list L plus authentication information about it
is created by a data owner and given to a server, who answers queries on L issued by a client, who
verifies the answers and proofs returned by the server using the public key of the data owner. We
assume the data owner is trusted by the client, who has the public key of the data owner. However,
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both the client and server can act as adversaries, as follows:
• The server is malicious and may try to forge proofs for incorrect answers to membership or
ordering queries. For example, the server may try to prove the membership of an element
not in L or an incorrect ordering of a pair of elements of L. Nevertheless, we trust the server
to follow the query protocol and not include into the answer additional information about L
besides what was requested by the client in the query.
• The client is curious and tries to learn from the proofs additional information about list L
beyond what she has inferred from the answers. For example, if the client has performed two
ordering queries with answers x < y and x < z, she may want to find out whether y < z
or z < y.
Note that in typical cloud database applications, the client is allowed to have only a restricted view
of the data structure and the server enforces an access control policy that prevents the client from
getting answers to unauthorized queries. This motivates the curious behavior by the client. The
client may behave maliciously and try to ask ill-formed queries or queries violating the access control
policy. But the server may just refuse to answer when the client asks illegal queries. So the client’s
legitimate behavior can be enforced by the server.
We wish to construct a privacy-preserving authenticated data structure for list L, i.e., a data
structure with the following two properties:
• Integrity: Proofs forged by the server for incorrect answers to queries do not pass the verifica-
tion performed by the client. This is the security property of a standard authenticated data
structure.
• Obliviousness: The client does not learn any information about the elements of the list or
about their ordering beyond what the client can infer from the answers.
1.1.3 Efficiency
We characterize the efficiency of a privacy-preserving authenticated data structure for a list, L,
of n items by means of the following space and time complexity measures:
• Server storage: Space at the server for storing list L and the authentication information and
for processing queries. Ideally, the server storage is O(n), irrespective of the number of queries
answered.
• Proof size: Size of the proof returned by the server to the client. Ideally, the proof has size
proportional to the answer size.
• Setup time: Work performed by the data owner to create the authentication information that
is sent to the server. Ideally, this should be O(n).
• Query time: Work performed by the server to answer a query and produce its proof. Ideally,
this work is proportional to the answer size.
• Verification time: Work performed by the client to verify the answer to a query using the proof
provided by the server and the public key of the data owner. Ideally, this work is proportional
to the answer size.
1.2 Related Work
We discuss the related literature in three sections. In the first section we discuss the relevant
signature schemes that can be interpreted in the privacy-preserving authenticated data structure
model. These signature schemes either do not consider privacy of the data or present a generic
framework for computing on authenticated data. In the second section we discuss privacy preserving
dictionary, range queries and vector commitment schemes. Finally we discuss the body of literature
regarding leakage-free redactable signature schemes for ordered lists in detail, since it is closest to
the problem that we are addressing in this work.
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1.2.1 Signature Schemes
Content extraction signature [SBZ01], redactable signature [JMSW02] and digital document sani-
tizing [MHI06] schemes can be viewed as three-party schemes where the owner digitally signs a
data document and the server discloses only part of the signed document to the client along with
a legitimately derived signature on it. Another line of work is transitive signature scheme, where
given the signatures of two edges (a, b) and (b, c) of a graph, it is possible to compute the signature
for the edge (or path) (a, c) without the signer’s secret key [MR02, Yi06, CH12].
However, these signature schemes are not designed to preserve privacy of the signed object,
which may include the content and/or the structure in which the content is stored.
Ahn et al. [ABC+12] present a unified framework for computing on authenticated data via
the notion of slightly homomorphic or P -homomorphic signatures, which was later improved by
[Wan12]. This broad class of P -homomorphic signatures includes quotable, arithmetic, redactable,
homomorphic, sanitizable and transitive signatures. This framework allows for a third party to
derive a signature on the object m′ from a signature on m as long as P (m,m′) = 1 for some
predicate P that captures the authenticatable relationship between m and m′. A derived signature
reveals no extra information about the parent m, referred to as strong context hiding. This work
does not consider predicates of a specific data structure.
The authors propose a general RSA-accumulator based scheme that is expensive in terms of
computation. In particular, the cost of signing depends on the predicate P and the size of the
message space and is O(n2) for a n-symbol message space. This privacy definition was recently
refined by [ALP12]. This line of work cannot be directly used for privacy preserving data structures
where efficiency is an important requirement and quadratic overhead may be prohibitive depending
on the application.
[CKLM13] gives definition and construction of malleable signature scheme. A signature scheme
is defined to be malleable if, given a signature σ on a message m, it is possible to efficiently derive
a signature σ′ on a message m′ such that m′ = T (m) for an allowable transformation T . Their
definition of context hiding requires unlinkability and allows for adversarially-generated keys and
signatures. This definition is stronger than that of [ABC+12] as it allows for adversarially-generated
keys and signatures. Unlinkability implies the following: a quoted (or derived) signature should be
indistinguishable from a fresh signature.
A motivating example proposed by the authors in [ABC+12] is impossibility of linking a quoted
portion from a document to the original document. However, in case of privacy preserving authen-
ticated data structure, it is important that the client is able to verify the membership, i.e, given a
quoted part of the document and a quoted signature, the client should be able to verify that the
quoted document is indeed a part of the original document that the client intends to query on.
Moreover, in the context of privacy preserving authenticated data structure model, we do not have
a scenario of adversarially-generated keys and signatures as the owner is a trusted party.
1.2.2 Privacy Preserving Dictionary Queries
A related line of work is privacy-preserving membership and non-membership queries on sets. Here,
the committer (owner) produces a short commitment to its secret set S of (key,value) pairs and the
commitment is made public. When a client asks a membership query of the form: “do you have an
entry with key x?”, the committer returns the answer along with a short proof of consistency of the
form x ∈ S or x /∈ S.
Buldas et al. [BLL02] consider proving dictionary queries using an authenticated search tree-
based construction. The construction produces a proof of (non)membership of size O(k log |S|)
where k is the size of the commitment and |S| denotes the set S. However, similar to other work
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on authenticated data structures, the proof reveals information about the underlying set, e.g., its
size and the location of the queried entry w.r.t other entries.
Zero knowledge sets [MRK03] allow one to answer membership queries while also hiding infor-
mation about unanswered queries, including the size of the database. The early work in this area
produces a commitment to a set S ⊂ {0, 1}n by constructing a Merkle tree of depth n. Therefore,
to guarantee that no information about |S| is revealed, n has to be chosen so that 2n is much larger
than any reasonable set size. In 2008, [CFM08] proposed a q-ary tree based solution with shorter
proof size though the proofs of membership are much longer than proofs of non-membership. In a
follow-up work Libert et al. [LY10] constructed a q-mercurial commitment achieving constant-size
openings.
Ostrovsky et al. [ORS04] generalized the idea of privacy preserving set membership queries
to support membership and orthogonal range queries on a multidimensional dataset using zero-
knowledge protocols. However, the use of NP-reductions and probabilistically checkable proofs
makes their generic construction inefficient as it requires O(poly(k)) rounds of communication where
k is the security parameter of the scheme. The authors of [ORS04] also provide a simpler protocol
based on explicit-hash Merkle Tree. However, this construction does not hide the size of the database
as the proof size is O(dlog ne) where n is the upper bound on the size of the database.
The problem of efficiently answering privacy preserving dictionary queries is very different from
our problem of privacy preserving ordered list queries where in addition to proving membership,
a proof of relative order between elements has to be returned without revealing any information
about the size of the list and unanswered order queries.
Vector commitments (VCs), introduced in [CF13], allow to commit to an ordered sequence of
values (m1, . . . ,mn) in such a way that one can later open the commitment at specific positions
(e.g., prove thatmi is the i-th committed message). Vector commitments are required to be position
binding, i.e, an adversary should not be able to open a commitment to two different values at the
same position. A VC is said to be hiding if one cannot distinguish whether the commitment was
created to a vector (m1, . . . ,mn) or (m′1, . . . ,m′n), even after seeing some openings. Though this
problem deals with a commitment to an ordered sequence of values, the opening is to a particular
known index position i. This does not meet the requirement of privacy preserving authenticated
lists where the index of an element should not be revealed. Moreover, VCs do not consider proofs
of pairwise relative order of elements.
1.2.3 Leakage-Free Signature Schemes for Ordered Lists
The authors of [CLX09] present a leakage-free redactable signature scheme that hides the location of
the redacted or deleted portions of the list at the expense of quadratic verification cost. [BBD+10]
present a scheme for ordered trees, which subsumes lists. Their idea is to sign all possible ordered
pairs of elements, so both the computation cost and the storage space are quadratic in the number
of elements of the list.
The transparency property introduced by [BBD+10] and invisibility property mentioned in [MHI06]
are very close to the strong context hiding property of [ABC+12]. However, the definition of strong
context hiding is stronger than that of [BBD+10] as it supports unlinkability. Building on the work
of [BBD+10], [SPB+12] propose redactable signatures for lists that have quadratic time and space
complexity. Poehls et al. [PSPDM12] present a redactable signature scheme for a list that has linear
time and space complexity but assumes an associative non-abelian hash function, whose existence
has not been formally proved. This construction preserves privacy between order queries, however
batch membership queries of the elements reveal the order between these elements. Hence, an ad-
versary can learn the order between elements without making an explicit order query. On the other
hand, privacy preserving authenticated data structures aim at protecting any information that has
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not been explicitly queries for. In [KAB12], the authors present a scheme that uses quadratic space
at the server and is not privacy-preserving with respect to our definitions (we discuss the attack in
Section 3.2.2).
1.3 Contributions and Organization of the Paper
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• After reviewing preliminary concepts in Section 2, in Section 3, we introduce a formal model
for a privacy-preserving list that supports membership and order queries on its elements.
• In Section 4, we present a construction of the above data structure based on bilinear maps
and we analyze its performance.
• Formal proofs for the integrity and obliviousness properties of our construction, based on
widely accepted assumptions, in the random oracle model are given in Section 6.
In Table 1 we compare our construction of a privacy-preserving authenticated data structure for
lists with previous work in terms of performance, and assumptions. We also indicate which con-
structions satisfy the privacy property of obliviousness. Our construction outperforms all previous
work that is based on widely accepted assumptions [BBD+10, SPB+12].
[SBZ01] [JMSW02] [CLX09] [BBD+10] [SPB+12] [PSPDM12] [KAB12] This Work
Obliviousness X X X X
Setup time n logn n n n2 n2 n n n
Space n n n n2 n2 n n2 n
Query time m n logn n mn m n n min(m logn, n)
Verification time m logn logm m logn n2 m2 m2 m m m
Integrity proof m m logn n m2 m m m m
Order proof m m logn n m2 m2 m n m
Assumption RSA RSA SRSA,Division EUCMA
ROH,
nEAE AnAHF
ROH,
RSA
ROH,
BDHI,
nBDHI
Table 1: Comparison of our construction of a privacy-preserving authenticated list with previous work. All
the time and space complexities are asymptotic. Notation: n is the number of elements of the list, m is
the number of elements in the query. Acronyms for the assumptions: Associative non-abelian hash func-
tion (AnAHF); Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Assumption (BDHI) n-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion
Assumption and n-weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Assumption (Decisional) (nBDHI); n-Element Ag-
gregate Extraction Assumption (nEAE); Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUCMA)
of the underlying signature scheme; Random Oracle Hypothesis (ROH); Strong RSA Assumption (SRSA);
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Data Type
We consider a linearly ordered list L as a data structure that the owner wishes to store with the
server. L is a linearly ordered list if ∀x1, x2 ∈ L, x1 6= x2 and either x1 < x2 or x2 < x1. Hence, < is
a strict order on elements of L that is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. We define the span
of a list L as the set of all ordered relations of this list using Span(L) = {(xi, xj) | ∀xi, xj ∈ L
if xi < xj}. We denote the set of elements of the list L as Elements(L). A sublist of L, δ, is
defined as: δ = {x | x ∈ Elements(L)}. Note that the order of elements in δ may not follow
the order of L. Let piL(δ) denote a permutation of the elements of δ under the order of L, i.e.,
Span(piL(δ)) ⊆ Span(L). We call the index position of element xi, its rank using rank(L, xi) = i.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
We now describe a signature scheme that is used in our construction and cryptographic assumptions
that underly the security of our method.
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2.2.1 Bilinear Aggregate Signature Scheme
We use bilinear aggregate signature scheme developed by Boneh et al. [BGLS03] for our pri-
vacy preserving authenticated data structure scheme. Given n signatures on n distinct messages
M1,M2, . . . ,Mn from n distinct users u1, u2, . . . , un, it is possible to aggregate all these signatures
into a single short signature such that the single signature (and the n messages) will convince the
verifier that the n users indeed signed the n original messages (i.e., user i signed message Mi for
i = 1, . . . , n). Here we describe the scheme for the case of a single user signing n distinct messages
M1,M2, . . . ,Mn. The decription of the generic case of n different users can be found at [BGLS03].
The following notation is used in the scheme:
• G,G1 are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p
• g is a generator of G
• e is computable bilinear nondegenerate map e : G×G→ G1
• H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a full domain hash function viewed as a random oracle that can be
instantiated with a cryptographic hash function.
Formally, a bilinear aggregate signature scheme is a 5 tuple of algorithm Key Generation, Sign-
ing, Verification, Aggregation, and Aggregate Verification. We discuss the construction below:
Key Generation: The secret key v is a random element of Zp and the public key x is set to gv.
Signing: The user signs the hash of each distinct message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ via σi ← H(Mi)v.
Verification: Given the user’s public key x, a messageMi and its signature σi, accept if e(σi, g) =
e(H(Mi), x) holds.
Aggregation: This is a public algorithm which does not need the user’s secret key to aggregate
the individual signatures. Let σi be the signature on a distinct message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ by the
user, according to the Signing algorithm (i = 1, . . . , n). The aggregate signature σ for a subset
of k signatures, where k ≤ n, is produced via σ ←∏ki=1 σi.
Aggregate Verification: Given the aggregate signature σ, k original messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mk
and the public key x:
1. ensure that all messages Mi are distinct, and reject otherwise.
2. accept if e(σ, g) = e(
∏k
i=1H(Mi), x).
Security Intuitively, the security requirement of an aggregate signature scheme is that the ag-
gregate signature σ is valid if and only if the aggregator was given all of the σi’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The formal model of security is called the aggregate chosen-key security model. The security of
aggregate signature schemes is expressed via a game where an adversary is challenged to forge an
aggregate signature:
Setup: The adversary A is provided with a public key PK of the aggregate signature scheme.
Query: A adaptively requests signatures on messages of his choice.
Response: Finally, A outputs k distinct messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mk and an aggregate signature σ.
A wins if the aggregate signature σ is a valid aggregate signature on messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mk
under PK, and σ is nontrivial, i.e., A did not request a signature on M1,M2, . . . ,Mk under PK. A
formal definition and a corresponding security proof of the scheme can be found in [BGLS03].
2.3 Hardness assumptions
We now describe the notation and the hardness assumptions used in the security of our constructions.
Let p be a large k-bit prime where k ∈ N is a security parameter. Let n ∈ N be polynomial in k,
n = poly(k). Let e : G × G → G1 be a bilinear map where G and G1 are groups of prime order p
and g be a random generator of G. We denote a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A,
or sometimes B, as an adversary who is running in time poly(k). We use Aalg(input,...) to show that
an adversary A has an oracle access to an instantiation of an algorithm alg with first argument set
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to input and . . . denoting that A can give arbitrary input for the rest of the arguments.
Definition 2.1 (n-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion (n-BDHI) [BB04]) Let s be a random
element of Z∗p and n be a positive integer. Then, for every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible
function ν(.) such that: Pr[s $←− Z∗p, y ← G1 : A(〈g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
n〉) : y = e(g, g) 1s ] ≤ ν(k).
Definition 2.2 (Decisional n-weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion (n-wBDHI) [BBG05])
Let n be a positive integer of size poly(k), r, s be random elements of Z∗p and y a random element
of G1. Then for every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that
|Pr[A(g, gr, 〈gs, gs2 , . . . , gsn〉, e(g, g)sn+1r) = 0]− Pr[A(g, gr, 〈gs, gs2 , . . . , gsn〉, y)) = 0]| ≤ ν(k)
3 Privacy Preserving Authenticated List (PPAL)
In this section we define a model for privacy preserving authenticated lists, PPAL, and present its
security and privacy definition.
3.1 Model
PPAL is a tuple of six probabilistic polynomial time algorithms executed between the owner of the
data list L, the server who stores L and answers queries from the client and the client who issues
queries and verifies corresponding answers.
(sk, pks, pkc)← KeyGen(1k), where k ∈ N is the security parameter of the scheme. The algorithm
produces a secret key sk for the owner and two public keys pks and pkc for the server and the
client, respectively.
(ΣL,ΩL, σL,L) ← Setup(sk,L), where sk is the secret key and L is a source list. The algorithm
outputs membership authentication information ΣL, order authentication information ΩL, a
digest signature σL for L and L itself.
Σδ ← MemberQuery(pks,L, δ,ΣL), where pks, L, ΣL are as defined above and δ is a membership
query defined as a sublist of elements of L: Elements(δ) ⊆ Elements(L). The algorithm returns
a member proof, Σδ, for δ.
(Σα, α,Ωα)← OrderQuery(pks,L, δ,ΣL,ΩL), where pks, L, δ, ΣL and ΩL are as above.
The algorithm returns the result of the query about the order of elements in δ w.r.t. L via
an ordered list α = piL(δ), its member proof Σα and its order proof Ωα. This algorithm runs
MemberQuery(pks,L, α,ΣL) as a subroutine to get Σα.
b ← MemberVerify(pkc,Σδ, δ, σL), where Σδ is a member proof for query δ and σL is the digest
signature for the source list L. The algorithm returns 1 if Elements(δ) ⊆ Elements(L), and 0,
otherwise.
b← OrderVerify(pkc,Σα, α,Ωα, δ, σL), Σα is a member proof and Ωα is an order proof for query δ.
The algorithm outputs 1 if MemberVerify(pkc,Σα, α, σL) = 1 and α = piL(δ). The algorithm
outputs 0, otherwise.
PPAL is run between the owner, the server and the client as follows. The owner runs KeyGen to
generate his secret key sk and public keys pks and pkc for the server and the client, respectively.
The owner then runs the Setup algorithm on his data L which is a linearly ordered list, and sends
to the server the list and the authentication information (ΣL,ΩL, σL) about the list and sends σL,
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the digest signature of the list, to the client. The client can interact with the server using two kinds
of queries: membership queries and ordering queries (see Section 1.1.1). The client sends to the
server the query type and a list of elements δ as input. For membership queries the server runs
the algorithm MemberQuery and returns its output to the client. In case of an ordering query, the
server runs OrderQuery, also returning the output to the client. The client verifies the authenticity
of a membership query by running MemberVerify. To verify a response to an ordering query, the
client verifies the order α as well as member information of elements in δ by running OrderVerify.
We often refer to MemberQuery and OrderQuery using an abstract primitive Query(pks,L, δ,ΣL,
ΩL). It returns the output of OrderQuery for order queries and augments a response Σδ ofMemberQuery
by returning (Σδ,⊥,⊥).
3.2 Security Properties
A PPAL scheme has two important security properties, namely integrity and obliviousness. In the
privacy preserving authenticated data structure setting, though the client interacts with the server,
it trusts only the owner about the integrity of the list. The integrity property of PPAL protects
against any potential forgery of the content or the structure of the source list by the server. On the
other hand, the client could try to learn information about the data beyond what she is allowed to
query. Obliviousness1 ensures that this cannot happen even when the client is allowed to adaptively
ask multiple queries on a static list.
PPAL ensures integrity for the content and the structure of the data, i.e., the order of the elements
in L, in our case. It also ensures obliviousness, that is, the client cannot infer any information about
the content and the structure of the source list beyond what she has explicitly queried for.
3.2.1 Content and Structural Integrity
Informally, content integrity states that no one should be able to compute a valid membership
authentication information for a list without access to the secret key, unless the list is a sublist of
the source list L. We adapt the content integrity definition for trees from [BBD+10] for strictly
ordered lists in our case.
Definition 3.1 (Content Integrity) A PPAL scheme satisfies content integrity iff for every PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that:
Pr[(sk, pks, pkc)← KeyGen(1k),
(ΣL∗ , σL∗ ,L∗ = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}, {ΣLi ,ΩLi , σLi ,Li}i∈[1,q])← ASetup(sk,...)(pks) :
MemberVerify(pkc,ΣL∗ ,L∗, σL∗) = 1 ∧ ∀ i ∈ [1, q],∀xj ∈ L∗ : rank(Li, xj) 6= j] ≤ ν(k),
where {ΣLi,ΩLi , σLi ,Li}i∈[1,q] is a sequence of outputs from A’s queries to Setup on lists Li, i ∈
[1, q] for q = poly(k), of its choice.
Structural integrity of a linearly ordered list ensures that tampering with the order of the elements
can be discovered by the verifier. In the three party setting we consider here, this property ensures
that the server cannot tamper with the order of the elements in L and return a valid order proof
to the client. This security notion is close to transitive signature unforgeability defined on directed
trees, hence we use the security definition from [Yi06].
1This property is also known as transparency and invisibility in the existing literature.
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Definition 3.2 (Structural Integrity) A PPAL scheme satisfies structural integrity iff for every
PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that:
Pr[(sk, pks, pkc)← KeyGen(1k),L ← ASetup(sk,...)(pks),
(ΣL,ΩL, σL,L)← Setup(sk,L), (Σα∗ , α∗,Ωα∗ , δ∗)← ASetup(sk,...)(pks,ΣL,ΩL, σL,L) :
OrderVerify(pkc,Σα∗ , α
∗,Ωα∗ , δ∗, σL) = 1 ∧ Span(α∗) 6⊆ Span(L)] ≤ ν(k),
where A picks a list of his choice L. A continues to have oracle access to Setup and can ask poly(k)
queries on lists of his choice. Finally A outputs the witness for a forged order, α∗, on the list L.
3.2.2 Context and Relative Order Obliviousness
Since we let the client ask multiple queries on a static list adaptively, it is possible that even though
the individual query responses do not leak any extraneous information about the source list, when
the responses are collected together, the client is able to infer some structural information about
the source list, which it had not explicitly queried for. We denote the collection of all the query
responses as the queried space. We will look at protecting privacy of the unqueried parts of the
list against the client in two parts: obliviousness within the queried space and obliviousness outside
the queried space. Context Obliviousness ensures that the client cannot learn any information that
it has not explicitly queried for, i.e., prevents the client from learning any information outside the
queried space. Relative Order Obliviousness prevents the client from learning any non-transitive
structural information within the queried space. Definitions in this section capture an adversarial
behavior of the client, as opposed to the server in the integrity definitions above.
Context Obliviousness The first privacy property, context obliviousness, guarantees that re-
ceiving a response to Query on query δ does not reveal where in L queried elements of δ are. In
other words, no information about L, other than what is queried for in δ is revealed.
We model this security definition as winning ContextOblivious game where an adversary is trying
to distinguish whether it is interacting with list L0 or L1 when L0 ⊂ L1. During the game the
adversary is allowed to query and receive proofs only for elements that appear in both lists, i.e., all
elements in L0.
We follow the transparency game introduced by [BBD+10] to define our ContextOblivious game
below and say that a PPT adversary B wins this game if b = b′.
Init The challenger C runs (sk, pks, pkc)← KeyGen(1k) and sends pkc to B. B is given oracle access
to Setup(sk, . . .) and Query(pks, . . .). Let ∆ be a sequence of lists that B queried and received
responses for from Setup(sk, . . .) and Query(pks, . . .).
B proceeds by generating two lists L0 and L1, such that L0,L1 /∈ ∆ and L0 ⊂ L1. Concisely,
(L0,L1)← BSetup(sk,...),Query(pks,...)(∆).
Setup C secretly picks b $←− {0, 1} and runs (ΣLb ,ΩLb , σLb ,Lb)← Setup(sk,Lb).
Query B adaptively issues polynomial number of calls to Query. For every queried sublist δi, C
proceeds with replying only if Elements(δi) ⊆ Elements(L0), where i ∈ [1, poly(k)].
If the condition is met, C runs (Σα, α,Ωα)← Query(pks,Lb, δ,ΣLb ,ΩLb) and returns (Σα, α,Ωα)
to B. Otherwise, C returns ⊥ as an answer.
Output B returns his guess b′.
Definition 3.3 (Context Oblivious) PPAL is context oblivious if for every PPT adversary B,
there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that the probability of winning ContextOblivious game is
at most 1/2 + ν(k).
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Relative Order Obliviousness This property protects potential leakage of any structural in-
formation that has not been explicitly asked for by the client from previous query responses. In a
linearly ordered list L, the order between any two elements x, y ∈ L can be inferred by comparing it
with a common element z ∈ L such that x < z, z < y (or y < z, z < x) using the rule of transitivity.
However, if z < x, z < y or x < z, y < z, then the order between x and y cannot be decided
from the two partial orders. The goal of the RelativeOrderGame is to protect against any inference
of relation between three or more elements given their individual membership proofs and pairwise
partial orders that are not related by transitivity.
We define RelativeOrderGame below and say that a PPT adversary B wins this game if b = b′.
Init The challenger C runs (sk, pks, pkc) ← KeyGen(1k) and sends pkc to B. B generates two lists
L0 and L1, each containing a pair of elements u and w, such that u < w in L0 and w < u
in L1.
Setup C picks a random b $←− {0, 1} and runs (ΣLb ,ΩLb , σLb ,Lb)← Setup(sk,Lb).
Query B adaptively issues polynomial number of query calls. For every query δ, C proceeds with
replying only if the following conditions on δ are met. If the query is a MemberQuery, then C
responds only if condition (1) is met. For an OrderQuery, C responds only if all three conditions
are met.
For every element z ∈ δ: (1) z ∈ L0 and z ∈ L1; (2) if u ∈ δ or w ∈ δ, then u < z ∧ w < z or
z < u ∧ z < w in Lb, that is for both lists L0 and L1 element z appears before u,w or after;
(3) for all pairs z1, z2 ∈ δ, z1 < z2 in both L0 and L1, or z2 < z1 in both L0 and L1.
When the condition(s) are met, C runs (Σα, α,Ωα) ← Query(pks,Lb, δ,ΣLb ,ΩLb) and returns
(Σα, α,Ωα) to B.
Otherwise, C returns ⊥ as an answer.
Output B returns his guess b′.
Note that C verifies conditions on the queries to avoid trivial distinguishability of the lists, e.g.,
based on elements that appear in one list and not the other.
Definition 3.4 (Relative Order Oblivious) PPAL is relative-order oblivious if for every PPT
adversary B, there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that the probability of winning RelativeOrderGame
games is at most 1/2 + ν(k).
Attack on [KAB12]’s scheme The scheme presented in [KAB12] generates a n′ bit secure name,
where n′ ≥ n, for each element of the list of size n. A high level idea of the scheme is as follows.
The secure name of an element has dedicated bits, where each bit corresponds to the pairwise order
between this element and every other element in the list. To prove the order between any two
elements, the verifier needs to know secure names for both of them. Then, given any two secure
names, the verifier can easily compute the required bit. This scheme is not relative order oblivious
as per Definition 3.4 for the following reason. Two order queries a < b and a < c, as per the scheme
of [KAB12], reveal to the client the secure names of all three elements a, b and c. Hence, given the
secure names of b and c, the client can easily compute the bit which preserves the order information
between b and c and infer the order between them.
4 Construction
We present an implementation of a privacy preserving authenticated list in Figure 2. We provide
the intuition of our method followed by a more details description.
Every element of the list is associated with a member witness. Every such pair of (element,
member witness) is signed by the owner and the signatures are aggregated using bilinear aggregate
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signature scheme to compute the list digest signature. Signatures and digest are sent to the server,
who can use them to prove authenticity when answering client queries. The advantage of using an
aggregate signature is for the the server to be able to compute a valid digest signature for any sublist
of the source list by exploiting the homomorphic nature of aggregate signatures, that is without
owner’s involvement. We use bilinear accumulators with randomization to compute the member
witnesses. This allows us to encode the rank of the element inside of the member witness and then
“blind” this rank information.
The owner also sends linear (in the list size) number of random elements used in the encod-
ing that allow the server to compute the order witnesses on queried elements, without the owner’s
involvement. The order witness encodes the distance between two elements without revealing any-
thing about it. Together with randomized accumulators as member witnesses, the client can use
bilinear map to verify the order of the elements.
We now describe the scheme in more detail. Our construction for PPAL is based on bilinear
accumulators and bilinear aggregate signature introduced in [BGLS03]. We denote member witness
for xi ∈ L as txi∈L. For two elements xi, xj ∈ L, such that xi < xj in L , txi<xj is an order witness
for the order between xi and xj .
The construction works as follows. The owner runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a pair
of secret keys and public keys for the server and the client. In the Setup phase, the owner picks
a distinct random element ri from the group Z∗p for each element xi in the list L, i ∈ [1, n]. The
element ri is used to compute the member witness txi∈L. Later in the protocol, together with rj ,
it is also used by the server to compute the order witness txi<xj for xi and xj ∈ L where xi < xj
in L. The owner also computes individual signatures, σi’s, for each element and aggregates them
into a digest signature σL for the list. It returns the signatures and member witnesses for every
element in ΣL and the set of random numbers picked for each index to be used in order witnesses
in ΩL. ΣL and ΩL are referred to as authentication information. The owner sends σL to the client
and (ΣL,ΩL, σL) to the server.
Given a query δ, member or order, the server uses information in ΣL to build a member proof
from member witnesses of elements in δ, T , and compute the digest signature σδ for δ and its
membership verification unit λL′ where L′ = L \ δ. For an order query δ, the server returns a
response list α that contains elements of δ in the order they appear in L. The server then uses
information in ΩL to compute Ωα, the order proof of the sublist. The client verifies the content
integrity of the query δ by running MemberVerify on the input from the server Σα and the digest
signature σL obtained from the owner. For order verification, the client uses Ωα.
Preprocessing at the Server For a query δ on the list L of length m and n, respectively,
the MemberQuery algorithm (and OrderQuery, as a consequence) in Figure 2 takes O(m) time to
compute σδ and O(n−m) to compute λL′ . The server can precompute and store some products to
reduce the overall running time of this algorithm to O(m log n) when m n. The precomputaion
proceeds as follows.
Let ψi = H(txi∈L||xi) for every element in L = {x1, . . . , xn}. Then the precomputation proceeds
by computing a balanced binary tree over n leaves, where ith leave corresponds to xi and stores ψi.
Each internal node of the tree stores the product of its children. Therefore the root stores the
complete product
∏n
i=1ψi. Computing each internal node takes time O(1) since at each internal
node product of at most two children is computed. Since the tree has O(n) nodes, the precomputaion
takes time O(n) and requires O(n) storage.
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Notation: k ∈ N is the security parameter of the scheme; G,G1 multiplicative cyclic groups of
prime order p where p is large k-bit prime; g: a random generator of G; e: computable bilinear
nondegenerate map e : G×G→ G1; H : {0, 1}∗ → G: full domain hash function (instantiated
with a cryptographic hash function); all arithmetic operations are performed using mod p. L is
the input list of size n = poly(k), where xi are distinct and rank(L, xi) = i. System parameters
are (p,G,G1, e, g,H).
(sk, pks, pkc)← KeyGen(1k), where k ∈ N is the security parameter and the output is:
sk= 〈s, v〉, s $←− Z∗p and v $←− Z∗p, where sk is the secret key of the owner.
pks= (gv, 〈g, gs, gs2 , . . . , gsn〉) and pkc= gv, where pks is the public key of the server and
pkc is the public key of the client.
(ΣL,ΩL, σL,L) ← Setup(sk,L), where L is the input list of length n. The output values are
set as ΣL = 〈{txi∈L, σi}1≤i≤n,H(ω)〉 and ΩL = 〈r1, r2, . . . , rn〉, ri 6= rj for i 6= j where ΣL
is the member authentication information ΩL is the order authentication information for
the list L and σL is the digest signature of the list L. These are computed as follows:
For every element xi in L = {x1, . . . , xn}:
Pick ri
$←− Z∗p. Compute member witness for index i as txi∈L ← (gs
i
)ri and signature
for element xi as σi ← H(txi∈L||xi)v.
Pick ω $←− {0, 1}∗ which should be unique for each list; call H(ω) as the nonce and
set salt ← (H(ω))v. salt is treated as a list identifier which protects against
mix-and-match attack and also protects from the leakage that the queried result
is the complete list.
The list digest signature is computed as: σL ← salt×
∏
1≤i≤nσi.
Σδ ← MemberQuery(pks,L, δ,ΣL), where ΣL = 〈{txi∈L, σi}1≤i≤n,H(ω)〉 and δ =
{z1, . . . , zm}. Return the output Σδ = 〈σδ, T, λL′〉 where L′ = L \ δ and:
The digest signature for the sublist is computed as σδ ←
∏
zj∈δσrank(L,zj) and the set of
member witnesses T = {tz1∈L, . . . , tzm∈L}.
Compute the member verification unit as: λL′ ← H(ω)×
∏
x∈L′H(txrank(L,x)∈L||x).
(Σα, α,Ωα) ← OrderQuery (pks,L, δ,ΩL,ΣL). Compute the response to the query δ as α =
piL(δ), where α = {y1, y2, . . . , ym}, and compute witnesses as follows.
Set Σα ← MemberQuery(pks,L, α,ΣL).
For every j ∈ [1,m− 1]:
Let i′ = rank(L, yj) and i′′ = rank(L, yj+1), and r′ = ΩL[i′]−1 and r′′ = ΩL[i′′].
Compute tyj<yj+1 = (gs
d
)
r′r′′
where d = |i′ − i′′| and gsd is part of pks.
Set Ωα to {ty1<y2 , ty2<y3 , . . . , tym−1<ym}.
b ← MemberVerify(pkc,Σδ, δ, σL) where Σδ = 〈σδ, T, λL′〉 where T = {tz1∈L, . . . , tzm∈L} and
δ = {z1, z2, . . . , zm}. Compute ξ ←
∏
zj∈δH(tzj∈L||zj) and call e to verify that: e(σδ, g) =
e(ξ, pkc) and e(σL, g) = e(σδ, g)× e(λL′ , pkc).
If both equalities hold set b = 1, else b = 0.
b ← OrderVerify(pkc,Σα, α,Ωα, δ, σL) where α = piL(δ) = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} Σα = 〈σα, T, λL′〉
with T = {ty1∈L, . . . , tym∈L} and Ωα = {ty1<y2 , ty2<y3 , . . . ,tym−1<ym}. Verification steps:
If MemberVerify(pkc,Σα, α, σL) returns 0, output 0. Otherwise proceed to the next step.
If for every j ∈ [1,m−1], e(tyj∈L,tyj<yj+1) = e(tyj+1∈L, g), return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
Figure 2: Construction of PPAL = (KeyGen, Setup,MemberQuery,OrderQuery,MemberVerify,OrderVerify).
Figure 1: Range tree showing the precomputed products where ψi = H(txi∈L||xi)
Now, computing λL′ will require computing the product of m + 1 partial products, i.e., the
intervals between elements in the query. Since each partial product can be computed using atmost
O(log n) of the precomputed products (as the height of the tree is O(log n)), the total time required
to compute the product of m + 1 partial products is O((m + 1) log n) = O(m log n). Hence, the
precomputation is useful whenever m  n. Otherwise, when m = O(n), the server can run the
MemberQuery as mentioned in the scheme in time O(n).
Complexity Analysis We measure the time and space complexity of our scheme in terms of n,
the length of the list L, and m, the length of the queried sublist δ. Recall that Elements(δ) ⊆
Elements(L). We denote the cardinality of a list L as |L|. So |L| = n and |δ| = m. We discuss and
summarize the time and space complexity for each party as follows:
Owner The Setup algorithm computes member and order witnesses for each element, along with
signatures for each element. Hence, the algorithm runs in time O(n) and requires O(n) space.
Server The MemberQuery algorithm has two steps. In the first step the server computes λL′ that
takes time O(n−m), i.e., for |L\δ| elements. In the second step, the server computes σδ in time
O(m). Hence, the overall runtime of MemberVerify is O(n). The server can precompute and
store some products of the signatures to reduce the overall running time of MemberQuery to
O(min{m log n, n}). In addition to runningMemberQuery, for OrderQuery the server calculates
m−1 order witnesses each taking constant time. So the running time of this algorithm is O(m).
Since the server runs both MemberQuery and OrderQuery, the overall run time for the server
is O(min{m log n, n}). The server needs to store the list itself, its authentication information
and the precomputed products. Since each of the these objects is of size O(n), the space
requirement at the server is O(n).
Client MemberVerify computes a hash for each element in the query δ, and then evaluates two
equalities using bilinear map. Hence, MemberVerify requires O(m) computation. OrderVerify
calls MemberVerify as a subroutine and then checks O(m) bilinear map equalities. So it runs
in time O(m) as well. Hence the overall verification time of the client is O(m). During the
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query phase, the client requires O(m) space to store her query and its response with the proof
for verification. The client also stores locally pkc and σL which require O(1) space.
Batch membership query If the client queries for the m elements individually, the verification
will require four bilinear map computations for every element, hence requiring a total of 4m bilinear
map computations. On the other hand, if the client chooses to do a batch query form elements, then
the verification will require m multiplications in the group G and four bilinear map computations.
If a multiplication operation can be performed faster than a bilinear map computation, verification
of a batch query is more efficient.
Batch ordering query The client can learn the total order among m different elements of the
list using a basic ordering query on two elements. This requires O(m2) individual order queries,
where each verification takes one multiplication in group G and six bilinear map computations.
The client can optimize the process and ask a singe batch ordering query for m elements. In this
case, the verification will require only m multiplications in the group G and 2m + 2 bilinear map
computations.
5 Preliminary Theorems
In this section, we present some preliminary theorems and observations that we use in the security
proofs in the subsequent section. These theorems can be of independent interest as well.
Theorem 5.1 Let {(x1, x2), (x3, x4), . . . (xm−1, xm)} be a set of element pairs at a particular dis-
tance d ∈ N in the ordered list L. Then, the collection of order witnesses, {tx1<x2 , tx3<x4 , . . . , txm−1<xm}
is identically distributed to {gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcm/2}, where c1, c2, . . . , cm/2 $←− Z∗p.
Proof Let ai = rank(L, xi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. As per our construction, the exponent for the order
witness for xi < xj : gs
aj−airjr−1i , where in Setup r1, . . . , rm are picked as random elements of Z∗p,
such that they are all distinct. Let d = aj − ai. Recall that if xi < xj then xi precedes xj in the
list L. We argue that order witnesses for elements at the same distance d have at least one random
element in its exponent that is independent of the exponent elements of all the other order witnesses
at distance d.
We view a list as a path graph where vertices are elements xi ∈ L and there is a directed
edge in the graph from every xi to xj where xi < xj in L. For every xi < xj , there can be
exactly one edge of length d that emanates from vertex xi and ends at vertex xj . Therefore two
edges of the same length must correspond to different source and sink vertices. Hence, the exponent
pairs for two cases can be the combination of any two of the following fours possibilities {sd, ri, r−1j },
{sd, rk, r−1i },{sd, rj , r−1l } and {sd, rk, r−1l }, where i 6= j 6= k 6= l (hence ri 6= rj 6= rk 6= rl). Therefore
each witness has at least one random exponent that is independent of the exponent elements of the
other order witnesses at distance d, and distinct with very high probability, since p  n is a large
prime, by the birthday paradox, the probability of a collision is low, ≈ 1− e−n
2
2p . Since the product
of a random element y $←− Z∗p with a fixed element x ∈ Z∗p produces a random element in Z∗p, the
exponent rjr−1i is a random element of Z∗p. Hence, gs
aj−airjr−1i can be written as gsdci where ci is a
random element of the group Z∗p. Therefore, {tx1<x2 , tx3<x4 , . . . , txm−1<xm} is identically distributed
to {gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcm/2}, where c1, c2, . . . , cm/2 are random elements of the group Z∗p.
Theorem 5.2 Let k, l, n ∈ N be poly(k) and l ≤ n, g be a random generator of the group G,
a1, . . . , an
$←− Z∗p and r, v $←− Z∗p. Let
G = {g, ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gal , gv, gva1 , gva2 , . . . , gval}.
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Then, for an algorithm B, on input G, there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that
|Pr[B(G, gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai+
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai), e(g, g)r+
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai) = 0]
−Pr[B(G, gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai), e(g, g)r) = 0]| ≤ ν(k)
Proof Let x, y, z ∈ G where x is a fixed element and z = xy. Then z is identically distributed to
y in G, in other words, if y is picked with probability γ, then so is z. The same argument holds for
elements in G1.
Since r, v and ai for all i ∈ [1, n] are picked randomly from Z∗p, gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai) is a random element
of G and we can think of gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai) as y and gv(
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai) as x and gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai+
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai)
as z in the argument above. Hence, gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai+
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai) and gv(r+
∑
i∈[1,l] ai) are identically
distributed in G.
Following the same argument, e(g, g)r+
∑
i∈[l+1,n] ai and e(g, g)r are identically distributed in G1
where all of v, r, ai, for i ∈ [1, n], are picked randomly from Z∗p.
Theorem 5.3 Let k, n ∈ N be poly(k), s $←− Z∗p, r1, . . . , rn $←− Z∗p and g be a random generator of
the group G. Let d1, . . . , dn ∈ N be arbitrary positive integers. Then, for any algorithm B, on input
Y = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 there exists a negligible function ν(.) such that
|Pr[B(Y, e(g, g)sr1 , e(g, g)s2r2 , . . . , e(g, g)snrn) = 0]−
Pr[B(Y, e(g, g)s1+d1r1 , e(g, g)s2+d2r2 , . . . , e(g, g)sn+dnrn) = 0]| ≤ ν(k)
Proof Since ri is a random element of Z∗p, and the product of a fixed element with a random
element of Z∗p produces a random element of Z∗p, exponents sri and si+diri are random elements
of Z∗p. Hence both e(g, g)sri and e(g, g)s
i+diri are identically distributed in G1.
Theorem 5.4 Let k ∈ N be the security parameter, a1, a2 ∈ N be arbitrary integers and d = |a1−a2|.
Let g be a random generator of G, and c1, . . . , cm, r′, r′′, s
$←− Z∗p and y be a random element of G1.
Let G = 〈gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcm〉. For any PPT algorithm B there exists a negligible function ν(.)
such that
|Pr[B(a1, a2, g, gsa1r′ ,G, e(g, g)sa2r′′) = 0]− Pr[B(a1, a2, g, gsa1r′ ,G, y) = 0]| ≤ ν(k)
Proof We prove that if there exists an algorithm B that has a non-negligible advantage in solving
this problem, then we can construct an algorithm A that solves the n-weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman
Inversion problem also with a non-negligible advantage.
We construct an algorithm A that solves the n-wBDHI problem with a non-negligible advantage
given black box access to algorithm B. A receives a random input instance of the n-wBDHI problem,
(g, gr, 〈gs, gs2 , . . . , gsn〉, y ∈ G1) and has access to the public parameters (p,G,G1, e). A has to
decide if y = e(g, g)sn+1r or if y $←− G1. A does the following:
1. Pick a1 and d from [1, n] such that a1 + d = n+ 1. Set a2 := n+ 1.
2. Pick c1, . . . , cn
$←− Z∗p and r′ $←− Z∗p
3. Compute G = 〈gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcn〉 and gsa1r′
4. Send a1, a2, g, gs
a1r′ ,G, y to B
5. Output B’s output
If B succeeds with non-negligible advantage (k), then A also succeeds with advantage (k).
Therefore we have successfully constructed an algorithm A that solves the n-wBDHI problem with
non-negligible advantage given a black box access to the algorithm B, hence arriving at a contra-
diction.
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6 Security of PPAL scheme
6.1 Content Integrity
The PPAL scheme described in Section 4 is based on bilinear aggregate signature scheme introduced
in [BGLS03]. Since the definition of content integrity is identical to the security of the bilinear
aggregate signature scheme of [BGLS03], the proof for the following theorem follows from [BGLS03]
(see Section 2.2.1 for the security definition of Bilinear Aggregate Signature).
Theorem 6.1 If Bilinear Aggregate Signature in [BGLS03] (Section 2.2.1) is secure against exis-
tential forgery in the aggregate chosen-key model then the PPAL scheme satisfies content integrity
according to Definition 3.1.
Proof We will show that if there exists a poly-time forger B who given oracle access to Setup
algorithm of PPAL, adaptively asks poly(k) queries on lists of its choice and finally outputs a forged
aggregate signature on a list of its choice, L, with non-negligible advantage, then we construct a
poly-time adversary A that successfully forges the bilinear aggregate signature in the aggregate
chosen-key model with non-negligible advantage.
Algorithm A is given the public parameters (p,G,GT , e, g) and a public key, PK, and has access
to the random oracle H. A runs and answers B’s queries as follows:
1. Pick a random s $←− Z∗p.
2. For every list that B queries, do the following:
(a) Let Li = {x1, . . . , xm}.
(b) Pick ωi, r1, . . . , rm
$←− Z∗p.
(c) Compute individual member witnesses as txj∈Li ← gs
jrj .
(d) Call its own signing oracle for a signature σj on each message (gs
jrj ||xj), ∀xj ∈ Li.
(e) Call its signing oracle on ωi. Let salti be the response.
(f) Compute σLi ← salti ×
∏
1≤j≤mσj .
(g) Return (ΣLi ,ΩLi , σLi ,Li) to B, where ΣLi = 〈{txj∈Li , σj}1≤j≤m,H(ωi)〉, Ω = 〈r1, r2, . . . , rm〉
and σLi as computed above.
3. Finally B outputs a list L∗ = {y1, y2, . . . , yl} that is not in its query tape along with its forgery
〈ΣL∗ ,ΩL∗ , σL∗〉 where ΣL∗ = 〈{tyj∈L∗ , σj}1≤j≤l,H(ω∗)〉 and H(ω∗) is the nonce for L∗.
4. A outputs messagesM1 = (ty1∈L∗ ||y1),M2 = (ty2∈L∗ ||y2), . . . ,Ml = (tyl∈L∗ ||yl) and the forged
aggregate signature
∏
1≤j≤lσj . Note that neither of these messages are in A’s query tape.
Therefore B inherits A’s success probability and therefore if A succeeds with non-negligible
advantage (k), so does B in forging the bilinear aggregate signature. Hence a contradiction.
6.2 Structure Integrity
Our construction of PPAL is based on Bilinear Aggregate Signature Scheme (see Section 2.2.1) and,
consequently, bilinear accumulators. Hence, we show that if PPAL does not guarantee structural
integrity then one can use it to break n-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion assumption in Definition 2.1
with non-negligible advantage over 12 .
Theorem 6.2 If n-Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption holds, then PPAL guarantees structural in-
tegrity according to Definition 3.2.
Proof We will show that if there exists a poly-time forger B who given oracle access to Setup
algorithm of PPAL, adaptively asks poly(k) queries on lists of its choice and finally outputs a forgery
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of a witness of order between two elements of a list of its choice, L, then we construct a poly-time
adversary A that successfully solves the n-BDHI Problem [BB04].
Algorithm A is given the public parameters (p,G,GT , e, g) and T = 〈g, gs, gs2 , . . . , gsn〉, where
n = poly(k). A runs as follows:
1. Pick v $←− Z∗p. Give pks = (gv, 〈g, gs, gs
2
, . . . gs
n〉) to B.
2. Answer B’s Setup query for a list |L| = n as follows:
(a) Pick ΩL = {ri $←− Z∗p}∀i∈[1,n], set txi∈L ← (gsi)
ri , compute σi ← H(txi∈L||xi)v, ∀xi ∈ L.
Pick ω $←− {0, 1}∗ and compute salt← (H(ω))v and σL ← salt×
∏
1≤i≤nσi.
(b) Send (ΣL = 〈{txi∈L, σi}1≤i≤n,H(ω)〉,ΩL, σL,L) to B.
3. Finally B outputs a forgery (Σα∗ , α∗,Ω∗α, δ∗) on a particular list L, where δ∗ = {xi, xj},
α∗ = {xi, xj}, Σα∗ = 〈(σi, σj), {txi∈L, txj∈L}, λL′〉 and Ωα∗ = txi<xj , L′ = L \ {xi, xj} and
xj <L xi. Then λL′ = H(ω) ×
∏
xi∈L′H(txi∈L||xi), where xi is in position i in L. Since
OrderVerify(pkc = g
v,Σα∗ , α
∗,Ω∗α, δ∗,L) = 1 then e(txi∈L, txi<xj ) = e(txj∈L, g). From our
construction, this implies txi<xj = (gs
(j−i)
)
rjr
−1
i .
4. A computes h← (gsi−j−1)rj
−1ri and outputs e(txi<xj , h) which equals e(g, g)
1
s
Therefore if B succeeds with non-negligible advantage (k) over 12 , then A successfully solves the
n-BDHI problem with advantage (k) over 12 as well.
6.3 Context Obliviousness of PPAL Scheme
Theorem 6.3 The PPAL scheme in Section 4 is context oblivious as per Definition 3.3.
Proof As per the ContextOblivious game an adversary A is given an oracle access to Setup and
Query. He then comes up with two lists L0 and L1 such that L0 ⊂ L1 and |L0| = n0 and |L1| = n1.
Recall that according to the game neither L0 nor L1 were queried before byA. Since Setup algorithm
uses a distinct nonce for every list and fresh random elements ri for every element of the list, the
adversary cannot reuse lists signed during Init phase, even if they contained a subset of elements
of L0 or L1. Let Lb = {x1, x2, . . . , xnb} be the list picked by the challenger. The challenger runs
Setup on list Lb. Then, A asks polynomially many queries as part of the Query phase.
During the game the adversary learns the list digest signature σLb and a sequence of the responses
of the form 〈Σα, α,Ωα〉 to all valid queries on Lb, i.e., queries that do not result in the response ⊥.
The rest of the proof is split into two parts. We first consider the digest signatures and authen-
tication units that A receives in each response. We then discuss member and order witnesses, along
with why they are can be considered independent of the signatures and authentication units.
Consider a query δ = {z1, . . . , zm}, where every zj equals a distinct xi ∈ Lb. For every element
xi ∈ Lb, the value H(txi∈Lb ||xi), by the property of the hash function H, viewed as a random
oracle, is a random element of the group G. Let us express H(txi∈Lb ||xi) as gai where ai is a
random exponent drawn from the support set Z∗p. Then, the digest signature σδ =
∏
zj∈δσi for
a query δ can be expressed as σδ =
∏
zj∈δH(txi∈Lb ||xi)
v =
∏
zj∈δg
aiv. This can be simplified as
σδ = g
v
∑
zj∈δ ai . Similarly, H(ω), the nonce, can be represented as gr for some random r ∈ Z∗p.
Let R be the set of ranks of elements in Lb that do not appear in the query δ. Then λL′b can be
written as λL′b = g
r×∏i∈Rgai . This can be simplified to λL′b = gr+∑i∈R ai . Further, we can rewrite
the list digest signature, σLb , as g
v(r+
∑
i∈[1,nb] ai).
Let Φ be a set of all distinct valid queries made by the adversary to the challenger. Then
let D = ∪δ∈Φδ be all the elements A learns from all the queries, i.e., the largest intersection of
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L0 and L1, which is L0. Therefore, D = L0. We capture all the digest signatures and member
authentication units A can receive from 〈Σδ〉δ∈Φ in the ContextOblivious game in
G = {g, ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gan0 , gv, gva1 , gva2 , . . . , gvan0 , gr′ , gv(r′+
∑
i∈[1,nb] ai)}
where r′ = r +
∑
i∈[n0+1,nb] ai. Note that if Lb \ D = ∅ i.e, b = 0, then r′ = r. In order to win
the ContextOblivious game, using this information the adversary needs to correctly guess whether
r′ = r+
∑
i∈[n0+1,n1] ai [corresponding to the case b = 1] or r
′ = r [corresponding to the case b = 0].
Since the adversary A is also given access to the bilinear map e, we model his challenge as
follows. Given
G = {g, ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gan0 , gv, gva1 , gva2 , . . . , gvan0 , gr′ , gv(r′+
∑
i∈[1,nb] ai)}
A has to distinguish e(g, g)r+
∑
i∈[n0+1,n1] ai from e(g, g)r, i.e., two cases of r′. From Theorem 5.2,
(where l = n0) it follows that A cannot distinguish between these two cases with non-negligible
advantage over a random guess.
In addition to this, A learns the member witnesses for all the elements of D = {x1, x2, . . . , xn0}
and possibly all the order witnesses. Let T = {tx1∈Lb , . . . , txn0∈Lb} be the list of all member witnesses
and W = {tx1<x2 , tx2<x3 , . . . , txn0−1<xn0} be the list of all the order witnesses. In our scheme txi∈L
= gs
i.ri , where s $←− Z∗p,ri $←− Z∗p and txi<xj = gs
j−i.rjr−1i where ri, rj
$←− Z∗p, ri 6= rj .
However, by the property of the hash function H, which is viewed as a random oracle, we see
that the hashed value is a random element of G and therefore any combination of the witnesses
along with these values (using bilinear map) produces a random element of the target group G1
and hence offers no meaningful information. Therefore, for the rest of the proof we treat witnesses
independently from the hashes and the digest signatures, discussed above.
Let the consecutive elements of L0 be at distances d1, . . . , dn0 between each other in L1. That is,
rank(L1, xi) = rank(L0, xi) + di. According to the game, d1, . . . , dn0 are known to the adversary A.
Therefore, given d1, . . . , dn in order to win the ContextOblivious game, A has to distinguish the
following two tuples with non-negligible advantage over a random guess:
{e(g, g)sr1 , e(g, g)s2r2 , . . . , e(g, g)sn0rn0} [b = 0]
{e(g, g)s1+d1r1 , e(g, g)s2+d2r2 , . . . , e(g, g)sn0+dn0 rn0} [b = 1]
From Theorem 5.3 (with n = n0) it follows that A cannot distinguish between these two cases
with a non-negligible advantage over a random guess.
6.4 Relative Order Obliviousness of PPAL
We now prove that the client who receives proofs for her queries (which includes member witnesses,
order witnesses and digest signatures) cannot infer any information about the order of the queried
elements beyond what she learns from the query result and any transitive information implied by
the query result. This security property for privacy preserving authenticated lists is captured in
RelativeOrderGame in Section 3.2.2.
Theorem 6.4 If n-wBDHI assumption holds, then the PPAL scheme in Section 4 is relative order
oblivious as per Definition 3.4.
Proof Let Φ be the list of all valid queries that the adversary A can request from the challenger C,
i.e., all the queries that do not have the response ⊥ and σLb be the list digest A receives. Then, let
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〈(Σα, α,Ωα)〉 be a sequence of the responses to all valid queries δ ∈ Φ that A can ask from C. Note
that for all valid queries δ the response α, that equals to piLb(δ), is the same regardless of whether
the list L0 or L1 was picked by C. According to the PPAL construction, Σα = 〈σα, T, λL′〉, where T
contains member witnesses, and Ωα contains order witnesses.
We use the following notation in the proof. Let D = ∪δ∈Φδ and A = piLb(D) = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}.
(Note that according to the game, D contains only elements in Elements(L0)∩Elements(L1).) Let T
be the collection of all the member witnesses of A, i.e., T = {ty1∈Lb , . . . , tyn∈Lb}. Let I be the
collection of all the order witnesses of Span(A), that is, I = {tyi<yj | ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. Let W be
the collection of all order witnesses on Span(A) that correspond to valid queries, as defined in the
RelativeOrderGame. That is W contains all the order witnesses on Lb that A can receive from C.
Hence, W ⊂ I.
We first show that if n-BDHI assumption holds A cannot use T andW to win RelativeOrderGame.
We then show that if the assumptions about the hash functionH hold, signature elements σδ, λL′ , σLb
also do not give him an advantage in winning RelativeOrderGame.
Let ai = rank(Lb, yi) for i ∈ [1, n]. Also let yl and ym, l < m, be the elements that correspond
to u and w in RelativeOrderGame. Without loss of generality, we assume that the two elements u
and w are in swapped positions in the two lists L0 and L1, that is, rank(L0, u) = rank(L1, w) and
rank(L1, u) = rank(L0, w). This assumption can only help the adversary A to enhance its success
probability in winning the game. Then,
yl = u, ym = w [b = 0]
yl = w, ym = u [b = 1].
All member witnesses can be captured in T = {gsa1r1 , gsa2r2 , . . . , gsalrl , . . . , gsamrm , . . . , gsanrn},
where ri ← Z∗p for i ∈ [1, n] and all order witnesses in I = {gs
(aj−ai)rjr−1i | ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. The
challenger C returns ⊥ for queries that would result in the following order witnesses:
F = {tyl<yi | ∀i ∈ [l + 1,m]} ∪ {tyj<ym | ∀j ∈ [l + 1,m− 1]}
= {gs(ai−al)rir−1l | ∀i ∈ [l + 1,m]} ∪ {gs(am−aj)rmr−1j | ∀j ∈ [l + 1,m− 1]}.
Then, W = I \ F.
The challenge for the adversary A is to decide the order between u and w given T and W. Let
d = |al − am|, which is also known to A. The adversary A can query and learn order witnesses of
distance d. Since there are n elements in A, there can be at most n pairs of elements in Span(A)
which are at distance d.
Therefore, W can contain elements of the form gsdr′′(r′)
−1
where at least one of r′, r′′ is different
from rl and rm (proof of Theorem 5.1). By Theorem 5.1 these order witnesses at distance d can be ex-
pressed as gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcn where c1, c2, . . . , cn are random elements of Z∗p. Therefore, if we can
prove that given n distinct values gsdc1 , gsdc2 , . . . , gsdcn and gs
alrl , A cannot distinguish e(g, g)samrm
from a random value ofG1 except with negligible advantage, that would directly imply thatA cannot
win the game with non-negligible advantage over 12 . In Theorem 5.4 we prove that no PPT algo-
rithm can distinguish e(g, g)samrm from a random value of G1, given al, am, g, gs
dc1 , gs
dc2 , . . . , gs
dcn
and gs
alrl , where |al − am| = d (replacing al = a1, am = a2, rl = r′, rm = r′′ in the theorem) if the
n-weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Assumption holds.
Recall that the adversary also receives σLb at the beginning of the game and σδ, λL′ during the
query phase. By the property of the hash function, H, which is viewed as a random oracle, all of the
proof objects, σδ, λL′ , σL are random elements of the group G and are independent of the member
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and order witnesses. This has been discussed elaborately in the proof of Theorem 6.3. Therefore,
these objects of the proof reveal no information about the rank of elements to A and cannot help
A win this game.
7 Conclusion and Future work
We have introduced a concept of a privacy-preserving authenticated ordered list along with its formal
security model. We also described a candidate construction that has linear time and space overhead
and is secure in the random oracle model. Exploring other data structures in privacy-preserving
authenticated mode and support for dynamic behavior and privacy-preserving non-membership
proof is left as future work.
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